Abstract: Using Chinese province-level panel data for 2001-2009, we investigate significant factors for the development of financial intermediation via trade credit in developing economies. First, we confirm that a competitive market environment, a well-functioning legal system and greater bank loans for non-state-sector firms promote the development of trade credit in China. Conversely, corruption hinders its development. Second, proper functioning of the legal system and bank lending to non-state-sector firms are highly likely to be the cause of the complex relationships between these determinants. Finally, an increase in the number of lawyers effectively improves the quality and function of the legal system, which in turn alleviates the harmful influence of corruption on trade credit development.
Introduction
Taking China as a case study, we investigate significant determinants for the development of financial intermediation through trade credit in developing economies. 1 In general, developing economies including China do not have a well-developed formal financial system such as banks and a capital market. In this environment, trade credit is an important candidate for effective alternative financing. Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) argue that firms are more likely to rely on trade credit in economies with inferior legal systems. Almost all developing economies have less efficient legal institutions. Özlü and Yalçın (2012) find that financially constrained firms with limited access to bank finance tend to substitute trade credit in Turkey, which has a more developed economy than
China.
Previous studies provide a background for this work. Many have investigated the supplier motivation for offering trade credit. On the one hand, some argue that a competitive market environment promotes the development of trade credit. Fabbri and Klapper (2008) and Van Horen (2004) show empirically that firms with weak market power relative to their customers generally offer more trade credit. Since the weak market power of supplier firms compared to their customers mainly stems from the competitive market for their products, these findings can be interpreted as supporting the concept that a competitive market environment can promote the development of financial intermediation through trade credit. Fisman and Raturi (2004) present a theoretical overview of market competition and trade credit provision. They state that competition among suppliers encourages customers to build a relationship with a supplier and establish creditworthiness 1 We call the development of financial intermediation through trade credit "development of trade credit" or "trade credit development" hereafter.
3 to obtain trade credit. Their theoretical expectation is supported by empirical evidence from African data. Taking Indonesian firms as a case study and using firm-level micro-data, Hyndman and Serio (2010) report an interesting finding: an inverse U-shaped relationship exists between market competition and trade credit supply by vendors.
2
On the other hand, securing of property rights by a legal system can positively affect the development of trade credit. In studying the relative importance of the courts and their relationship in contract enforcement in the context of Russia, Ukraine and Eastern European countries, Johnson et al. (2002) confirm that legal protection of property rights by well-functioning courts encourages entrepreneurs to offer trade credit.
However, to the best of our knowledge, there has been no comprehensive empirical analysis of the determinants of trade credit development, particularly in the context of developing economies. Previous studies focused on single determinants of trade credit development and did not investigate the complex relations between determinants. Therefore, we investigate the effective determinants of trade credit development among candidate factors in the context of developing economies. Chinese province-level data are used. The differences in trade credit development between provinces enable us to tackle this issue effectively.
The viewpoint of trade credit development in the context of the Chinese economy also provides important suggestions for our tests.
Pointing out that although it does not have a well-developed legal or financial system, 2 Aktas et al. (2012) present an interesting explanation and empirical evidence of the motivation for firms to receive trade credit rather than offer it. They argue that firm mangers use trade credit finance to convey valuable information to external investors, such as the quality of the firm's investments.
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China has one of the fastest-growing economies, Allen et al. (2005) argue that China may be an important counter-example to the focus of the legal and financial literature on formal systems. They suggest that alternative financing channels, rather than formal external finance, support the fastest-growing Chinese firms, namely private firms. In response to their argument, several studies have investigated whether alternative financing channels really work as a substitute for formal financial systems in supporting the growth of firms and the economy in China (Cheng and Degryse, 2007; Ge and Qiu, 2007; Ayyagari et al., 2010; Cull et al., 2009; Du et al., 2012) . Although no consensus on this issue has been reached, alternative financing channels are likely to contribute to the fast economic growth of China, at least to some extent. Fisman and Raturi (2004) state that previous research has often treated trade credit access as a proxy for inter-firm trust (Johnson et al., 2002; Fafchamps, 2004) , which they adopt in their own work. Therefore, our investigation of the determinants of trade credit development in China can be also interpreted as a study of factors that lead to trust between Chinese firms. The development of inter-firm trust should contribute to economic growth in 3 Using a World Bank data set of Chinese firms, Du et al. (2012) compare the relative importance of bank loans and trade credit in promoting firm performance. While their findings favor bank loans over trade credit, there are crucial problems in their empirical analysis, including an invalid instrumental variable for trade credit, inadequate control of the market structure (monopolistic or competitive) and differing production technology between industries, and the influence of outliers. As a result, the disparity in trade credit development between interior and coastal provinces has increased (Fig. 2 ). This puts in question the sustainability of recent economic development in the interior provinces. Therefore, it is important to investigate how to develop trade credit in China to guide policy-making for effective financing channels, particularly in the interior provinces. while we measure the development of trade credit in a province as accounts receivable/gross assets, we can obtain the same positive correlation between the development of trade credit and the provincial economy even when using accounts payable/gross assets. This is because accounts receivable and payable are largely balanced in a province. For firm-level behavior, Fabbri and Klapper (2008) also find that firms tend to match contract terms for accounts receivable and payable in China, which likely results in balanced receivables and payables. 5 Coastal areas here comprise the following provinces: Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong, Fujian, and Guangdong. The interior areas studied comprise the other provinces.
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Section 2 explains the conceptual framework and introduces candidate determinants of trade credit development in China and the complex relations among them. Section 3 specifies the empirical models used and explains the estimation strategy. Section 4 presents the data used for our econometric analysis. Section 5 describes and discusses the estimation results. Conclusions are presented in Section 6.
Conceptual framework
In this section we construct the basic framework for our study by introducing several candidate determinants of trade credit development in China and describing the complex relations among them.
Candidate determinants of trade credit development in China
We consider the following four candidate determinants of trade credit development in China: a competitive market environment, a well-functioning legal system, less corruption, and financial factors affecting demand and supply for trade credit finance. 6 6 Giannetti et al. (2011) find that suppliers of differentiated products and services offer greater trade credit than suppliers of standardized goods. This is likely because suppliers of differentiated products and services are hard to replace since they provide unique or highly customized inputs and differentiated products and services are difficult to divert for unintended purposes. This leads to strong relationships between suppliers of differentiated goods and services and their customers and shields such suppliers against buyer opportunism (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004) . This finding suggests that industrial relationships between firms and the nature of goods traded is a determinant for trade credit development. Unfortunately, however, data accurately capturing these relationships at
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(1) Competitive market environment
As shown by Van Horen (2004) , Fisman and Raturi (2004) , and Fabbri and Klapper (2008) , a competitive market environment is a prospective determinant of trade credit development. The reason for choosing this candidate determinant has been provided in Section 1. A variant of market competitiveness is the presence of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). First, a greater SME presence directly implies a more competitive market environment. Second, SMEs -which are likely to suffer more from credit constraints because of weaker banking relationships -tend to demand trade credit finance (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Nilsen, 2002; Fisman and Love, 2003) . provincial level in China are unavailable. Therefore, this candidate determinant could not be investigated in the present study. 7 The attachment of importance to market structure, specifically the presence of SMEs, is based on a helpful comment by an anonymous reviewer.
(3) Less corruption
Corruption as a negative factor is a candidate determinant of trade credit development.
Here we assume that corruption essentially involve insecure property rights due to expropriation by the government and weak institutions for contract enforcement (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Cull and Xu, 2005 On the demand side, firms with less access to substitutive external funds, typically bank loans, may be more dependent on receiving trade credit for their finance. 9 Biais and Gollier (1997) argue that firms receive more trade credit when they receive less in bank loans. Therefore, more bank loans for non-state-sector firms can lead to less demand for trade credit finance. 10 Furthermore, a higher share of non-state-owned commercial banks in total bank lending is expected to increase bank loans for non-state-sector firms, since the primary function of state banks is to channel savings to state-sector firms in China (Guariglia and Poncet, 2008; Boyreau-Debray, 2003) . Therefore, a higher share of non-state-owned commercial banks in total bank lending could also decrease demand for trade credit finance by increasing bank loans for non-state-sector firms. Thus, when focusing on the demand side for trade credit finance, bank loans for non-state-sector firms and the share of non-state-owned commercial banks in total bank lending are direct and indirect negative factors, respectively. However, we should also take into account other 9 Our consideration of demand-side factors for trade credit is based on a useful comment by an anonymous reviewer.
10 This arises partly from the more expensive financing costs for trade credit than bank loans (Brandt and Li, 2003) .
effects, namely, supply-side factors.
On the supply side, more bank loans for non-state-sector firms and a higher share of non-state-owned commercial banks in total bank lending can allow non-state-sector firms, the main suppliers of trade credit, to offer more trade credit to their customers. In other words, it could be that these two factors facilitate credit creation among firms using trade credit. Considering the biased financial allocation through bank lending to state-sector over non-state-sector firms in China, the influence on trade credit supply of bank loans for non-state-sector firms cannot be ignored (Guariglia et al., 2011; Ding et al., 2012) . Thus, when focusing on the supply side for trade credit finance, these are positive factors. It depends on whether the demand effect or the supply effects are dominant as to whether these financial factors work positively or negatively for trade credit development in China.
This should be investigated empirically.
Complex relations between the determinants
The determinants mentioned above are not independent but have complex relations with each other. An example is the causality between two determinants whereby a well-functioning legal system could directly alleviate corruption, which subsequently results in trade credit development. More bank loans for non-state-sector firms and a higher share of non-state-owned commercial banks in total bank lending might also mitigate government corruption. The mechanism might be that more bank loans for non-state-sector firms (or, equivalently, fewer bank loans for state-sector firms) that are possible government expropriation targets might allow them to avoid corruption, namely being grabbed by the government.
Corruption could also affect other determinants. It is likely to discourage prospective firms from entering the market for fear that the government will grab them. This definitely leads to a less competitive market environment. On the contrary, a well-functioning legal system is likely to encourage prospective firms to enter the market via secure property rights and contract enforcement. This leads to a competitive market environment.
Furthermore, serious corruption could harm the functioning of the legal system through political pressure from the government. In addition, corruption could be associated with greater financial support of state-sector firms through bank lending.
To analyze these complex relations, we consider first-stage estimation results in an econometric analysis using system GMM estimation with "collapsed" instrumental
variables. This will give us an insight into which determinants are primary factors in trade credit development, which should be priority targets for policy makers.
Empirical models and estimation strategy
This section explains the empirical models and estimation strategy used to analyze the significant determinants of trade credit development in China. For this purpose, we use the following empirical model:
Trade credit development it = α + α t + β 1 competitive market environment it-1 + β 2 legal system it-1 + β 3 corruption it-1 + β 4 financial factors it-1 + ε it ,
where i and t denote the province and time (year), respectively, and
The disturbance term ε it has two components: the province-specific fixed effect μ i and the pure error term (idiosyncratic shocks) e it . 11 The error term e it is taken to be independently distributed over i and t with zero mean. The province-specific fixed effect μ i is expected to control unobservable province-specific and time-invariant factors. α t is a year-specific term.
Thus, β 1 , β 2 , β 3 and β 4 are the coefficients to be estimated.
We set a one-period time lag between the dependent variable (trade credit development t ) and important independent variables (competitive market environment t-1 , legal system t-1 , corruption t-1 , and financial factors t-1 ) to avoid reverse causality between the dependent and independent variables as much as possible. Variables in bold font represent variable vectors.
We use the system GMM estimation technique developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) in panel estimation to cope with the remaining endogeneity problem of independent variables. 12, 13, 14 The system GMM estimator is designed to address the endogeneity of independent variables in panel estimation and the weak instrument problem in the first-differenced GMM proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) . It combines regression in differences with regression in levels, where the instruments for the former are generally the 11 In system GMM estimation, it is difficult to assume random effects for the firm-specific term μ i because μ i is structurally correlated with lagged dependent variable as an independent variable in the dynamic panel model for which first-differenced and system GMM estimations were originally proposed. 12 Typically, the remaining endogeneity problem of independent variables is caused by reverse causality from dependent to independent variables and omitting an independent variable into the error term e it . 13 See Roodman (2008) for the system GMM estimation.
14 We use two-step instead of one-step GMM since the former is asymptotically more efficient. Thus, we apply the Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix to settle the potentially downward-biased two-step standard errors.
13 lagged levels of endogenous or predetermined variables and the instruments for the latter are the lagged differences of those variables.
Among the independent variables introduced above, province and year dummies measuring province-and year-specific effects, respectively, can be assumed to be exogenous. Endogeneity is suspected for the other independent variables. A one-period lag is taken for these variables. Strictly speaking, therefore, they are not endogenous but are predetermined variables in that they can be correlated with e it-1 and e before period t-1 and cannot be correlated with e it and e after period t. Since realizations of the predetermined variables occur before that of the current error term e it , they cannot be correlated.
Thus, in system GMM, estimation of first-differenced and level equations for (1) is conducted using adequate instrument variables for each equation. The first-differenced equation for (1) removes and controls unobservable province-specific and time-invariant factors, μ i . Thus, for the first-differenced equation, two-period lagged levels of the predetermined variables (competitive market environment t-2 , legal system t-2 , corruption t-2 , and financial factors t-2 ) are used as instrumental variables in addition to first-differenced year dummies as exogenous variables. The coefficients for province dummies are estimated in level equation (1). Thus, for estimation of level equation (1), one-period lagged differences for the predetermined variables (Δcompetitive market environment t-1 , Δlegal system t-1 , Δcorruption t-1 , and Δfinancial factors t-1 ) are used as instrumental variables in addition to province and year dummies as exogenous variables. Here, lagged differences for the predetermined variables are defined as
To avoid overfitting of large instruments to endogenous variables, we limit instrument variables to two-period lagged levels and one-period lagged differences of the predetermined variables besides exogenous variables, and use these instruments in collapsed form (Roodman, 2008 (Roodman, , 2009 . Because the data are provincial panel data and the number of individual units (provinces in this case) is relatively small, we should pay particular attention to the overfitting problem in using large instruments. Furthermore, these limited instruments enable us to easily check the first-stage estimation results. This is quite helpful for disentangling the complex relations between determinants of trade credit development in China.
The validity of the instruments introduced above depends on the two following assumptions. The first is that the instruments are exogenous. More precisely, the instruments used are not correlated with current error terms (Δe it = e it -e it-1 ) for difference regression and are not correlated with ε it = μ i + e it for level regression. The second is that the pure error term e it is not serially correlated. For these assumptions, two tests are proposed to assess the validity of the instruments. The first, for instrument exogeneity, is the Sargan or Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, which tests the overall validity of an instrument by checking the validity of moment conditions in the sample used. 15 The second, for serial correlation of e it , is the autoregressive test proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) . By construction, the error term in difference regression is allowed to be first-order serially correlated, whereas second-order serial correlation of the error term violates the instrument validity. Thus, checking the second-order serial correlation of the differenced error term, AR(2), works as a test for serial correlation of e it . 
Estimation results
Table 2 presents the final system GMM estimation results.
(Table 2)
For all specifications, the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions shows p-values that cannot reject the null hypothesis that instruments used for the estimation are exogenous.
Furthermore, results for AR(2) also cannot detect serial correlation of e it at the usual critical value for any specification. These results confirm the validity of the instruments used. variable. The estimated coefficient is significantly negative, and we can obtain largely similar results regarding the other independent variables for static specifications. This confirms the robustness of our estimation results for empirical model (1).
Next, we try to disentangle the relations between these determinants of trade credit 19 development in China.
As explained above, because of these limited instruments, we can easily check the first-stage results for system GMM estimation. This check helps us to disentangle the complex causal relations between the determinants of trade credit development in China.
The results are shown in Tables 3, 4 , 5, 6, 7 and 8.
(Tables 3 and 4)
First, the levels and differences for competitive market environment variables in Tables 3 and 4 are affected by two-period lagged levels and one-period lagged differences for the legal system and corruption variables, respectively, in addition to those for themselves. The levels and differences for the legal-system variable have a positive effect and those for the corruption variable have a negative effect on competitive market environment variables. This confirms that a well-functioning legal system encourages prospective firms to enter the market, possibly via secure property rights and contract enforcement, which leads to a competitive market environment. On the contrary, corruption discourages prospective firms from entering the market for fear of government exploitation, which leads to a less competitive market environment.
(Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8)
We skip Tables 5 and 6 and look at the results for first-stage regression with corruption variables as the dependent variables in Tables 7 and 8 . The corruption variables are negatively affected by legal system variables and the financial factor variables representing bank loans to non-state-sector firms, in addition to themselves. Thus, we can confirm several points. First, we note the bridged causality starting from the legal system leading to corruption as an intermediary and eventually resulting in market competitiveness.
Second, the corruption-promoting effect of financial support of state-sector firms (less financial support of non-state-sector firms) through bank lending confirms the mechanism 20 mentioned above: government corruption is mitigated by restraining allocation of abundant financial resources to state-sector firms through bank lending in China.
Finally, legal system variables and the financial factor variables representing bank loans to non-state-sector firms in Tables 5-8 are explained only by lagged levels and differences for themselves. Differing from our expectation, there is no statistical evidence that corruption harms the functioning of the legal system through political pressure from the government or that corruption is associated with greater financial support of state-sector firms through bank lending. This suggests that the functioning of the legal system and bank lending to non-state-sector firms are highly likely to be the starting points for the complex causal relations. In addition, they have a direct positive influence on trade credit development in China, as we saw above. Therefore, these two factors should be policy targets with the highest priority for the development of trade credit. In other words, if policy makers want to develop financial intermediation via trade credit in China, improving the quality of the legal system and increasing bank lending to non-state-sector firms (reducing financial support of state-sector firms through bank lending) can be recommended.
We now return to the final estimation results in Table 2 . Specifications (1) First, we confirmed that a competitive market environment, a well-functioning legal system and greater bank loans for non-state-sector firms promote the development of trade 22 credit in China. In contrast to these factors, corruption hinders its development.
Second, these factors are not independent but have complex relations with each other.
We can confirm these relations by checking the first-stage GMM estimation results, which is possible because of the limited instrument variables used in collapsed form. For example, a well-functioning legal system encourages prospective new firms to enter the market, possibly via secure property rights, which leads to a competitive market environment.
Financial support of state-sector firms through bank lending has a corruption-promoting effect because granting of abundant financial resources to state-sector firms tends to promote government corruption in China via the stronger ability of these firms to endure corruption, namely being grabbed by the government.
Third, the first-stage GMM estimation results enable us to disentangle the complex relations between determinants. The statistical evidence suggests that functioning of the legal system and bank lending to non-state-sector firms are highly likely to be the starting points for these relations. A policy implication arising from this finding is that improving the quality of the legal system and increasing and reducing bank lending to non-state-sector and state-sector firms, respectively, should be given higher priorities for the development of trade credit in developing economies such as China.
Finally, an increase in the number of lawyers effectively improves the quality and function of the legal system, which in turn alleviates the harmful influence of corruption on trade credit development.
This study clarifies how trade credit develops in a developing economy using province-level aggregated panel data. However, many factors in the complicated mechanism of trade credit development in developing economies are unknown. Further research using firm-level micro data is needed to investigate in more detail what factors promote the development of trade credit in developing economies, including China. 1 Δx -1 is defined as change of variable x between periods t-1 and t-2:
:
(1) Competitive market environment 1 Δx -1 is defined as change of variable x between periods t-1 and t-2:
: 1 Δx -1 is defined as change of variable x between periods t-1 and t-2:
: x -1 -x -2 . 1 Δx -1 is defined as change of variable x between periods t-1 and t-2:
: x -1 -x -2 . Table 8 The First-stage Results for System GMM Estimation (3) and (4) 
